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The Effect of Twitter Dissemination on Cost of Equity: A Big Data Approach 
 
Abstract 
 
Reducing information asymmetry between investors and a firm can have an impact on the cost 
of equity, especially in an environment or times of uncertainty. New technologies can 
potentially help disseminate corporate financial information, reducing such asymmetries. In 
this paper we analyse firms’ dissemination decisions using Twitter, developing a 
comprehensive measure of the amount of financial information that a company makes available 
to investors (iDisc) from a big data of firms’ tweets (1,197,208 tweets). Using a sample of 
4,131 firm-year observations for 791 non-financial firms listed on the US NASDAQ stock 
exchange over the period 2009-2015, we find evidence that iDisc significantly reduces the cost 
of equity. These results are pronounced for less visible firms which are relatively small in size, 
have a low analyst following and a small number of investors. Highly visible firms are less 
likely to benefit from iDisc in influencing their cost of equity as other communication channels 
may have widely disseminated their financial information. Our investigations encourage managers 
to consider the benefits of directly spreading a firm’s financial information to stakeholders and potential 
investors using social media in order to reduce firm equity premium (COE). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Revolutionary communication tools, such as social media applications, provide a massive 
amount of information (“big data”), which leads to a great deal of attention and action on the 
part of firms (de Camargo Fiorini, Seles, Jabbour, Mariano, & de Sousa Jabbour, 2018). These 
tools of big data bring profound changes in the way that firms manage their customers and 
business (see Raguseo, 2018), and have become important channels to diffuse information 
(Agarwal, Kumar & Goel, 2019), as part of firms’ disclosure strategy to meet the increased 
demand for information by investors. A key objective is to reduce the uncertainty about current 
and future investment opportunities. Corporate disclosure can help to reduce the information 
asymmetry that exists between management and market participants, and between informed 
and uninformed investors (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; O. Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000). In turn, this can have significant implications as to which companies attract 
the necessary financial resources to grow and become successful. 
Although corporate information is assumed to be available to all market participants once 
firms disclose, “most firms have difficulty ensuring their news reaches a broad set of 
investors”, which results in information asymmetry (Blankespoor, Miller, & White, 2014, p. 
80) and this increases the need for a better dissemination strategy. This strategy is about a 
firm’s decision to spread information about the firm to the public through specific channels or 
not. A firm's decision to disseminate is different from its voluntary disclosure decision, which 
focuses more on providing information, if the benefits of disclosure outweigh the associated 
processing and proprietary costs (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009b). Dissemination is also 
necessary for informing investors about a firm, resulting in improving investor recognition of 
the stock and therefore a lower cost of equity (hereafter, COE) (Merton, 1987). The challenge 
is that investors can only spend limited time and pay little attention to news about firms, due 
to the acquisition cost that they bear through searching, retrieving and understanding the 
required information (Hirshleifer, Lim, & Teoh, 2011; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; Hong & 
Stein, 1999; Merton, 1987). As such, investors may rely on few information intermediaries, 
such as the press, to receive news about firms. Due to limitations in coverage, there is a high 
chance that investors will not receive the news about lower press coverage firms or start-ups 
that do not command the necessary recognition. Instead, managers may use social media as a 
complementary channel to address this challenge (Blankespoor et al., 2014). This makes it 
possible for investors to obtain relevant information on a timely basis and in doing so to reduce 
the acquisition cost of information, by saving the time and energy needed to search for relevant 
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news. Such dissemination activity is expected to lead to lower information asymmetry and 
improve investor recognition. Therefore, our study seeks to examine whether a firm's 
dissemination of financial information (iDisc) on Twitter has an impact on the firm’s COE.  
The effect of dissemination decisions has not been widely explored in the literature due to 
the difficulty of isolating dissemination from disclosure. Prior studies (Kimbrough & Louis, 
2011; Mayew, 2008) have been either silent about the dissemination role or assume that 
dissemination exists once the disclosure is released. Although recent studies (Bushee, Core, 
Guay, & Hamm, 2010; E. X. Li, Ramesh, & Shen, 2011) have pointed out that dissemination 
can be isolated from disclosure through press coverage, firms have no control over the content 
and dissemination decision of the press. The press is also likely to adjust the content of 
information by expressing opinions, including summaries, or providing additional information, 
which makes the effect of dissemination unclear. Conversely, firms may opt to use Twitter for 
dissemination as they can have full control over the volume, frequency and timing of the 
disseminated information and can reach investors undiluted. However, there is little empirical 
evidence on how firms' dissemination of financial information on Twitter can be valuable to 
firms. Hence, this study aims to shed light on whether iDisc affects their COE, also controlling 
for many relevant factors. 
By meeting our objectives, we show that firms can reduce the COE by improving their 
information environment through their dissemination activities on big data information 
technologies channels. This evidence suggests that the managerial choice of using iDisc and 
diffusing information through their social media accounts could be perceived as part of the 
firm’s strategic voluntary disclosure policy. This finding also shows the importance of using 
Twitter as a communication channel to connect with market participants, to reduce investors’ 
acquisition costs, reduce the gap between informed and uninformed investors and help 
investors to make better investment decisions. This paper contributes to the growing literature 
on the market consequences of firms’ dissemination of information on Twitter (Blankespoor et 
al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015; Lee et al., 2015; Jung et al., 2017; Mazboudi & Khalil, 2017). 
These studies show how firms benefit from Twitter activity by improving market liquidity and 
attenuating negative market reaction. First, we show how iDisc affects the implied COE, based 
on an average of four measures of COE. Our study adds to Al Guindy (2016), which examined 
firms’ use of Twitter and the cost of capital. We have examined the dissemination effect, which 
is different from firms’ decisions to use Twitter. We have also used dissimilar COE estimates, 
more control variables and a different estimation model. In addition, our study contributes to 
previous studies by focusing on firms that are traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange and by 
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selecting a longer sample period. Second, while previous studies examined the effect of the 
level and quality of a variety of disclosure information and channels (Botosan, 1997; Orens, 
Aerts, & Cormier, 2010; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011; Mangena, Li, & 
Tauringana 2016), our empirical settings focus on firms' dissemination activity. Our results 
show that dissemination has a meaningful effect on COE, which is not in line with prior studies 
(Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007, 2011) that argue that the real effect is from the 
information precision. Although tweets are short messages which are expected to have a 
smaller amount of information than an annual report, our results show the influence of iDisc 
on COE. Third, we contribute to previous studies (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2017) 
that isolate the effect of dissemination from disclosure by examining the influence of 
dissemination on the COE. Fourth, the findings remain unchanged under varied news 
magnitudes and contents. Therefore, we extend the prior evidence of Kothari et al. (2009a) by 
examining the effect of dissemination and the tone of a new information intermediary, Twitter, 
and big data on the COE. Finally, we contribute to the literature on big data (e.g. Sivarajah, 
Kamal, Irani, & Weerakkody, 2017; Stieglitz, Mirbabaie, Ross, & Neuberger, 2018; Warren 
Jr, Moffitt, & Byrnes, 2015) by collecting over a million pieces of data for a longitudinal time 
period and constructing a measure of the amount of financial information that firms diffuse 
from the large set of firms’ tweets data. While some studies focus on outside and within firm 
data (e.g. Gandomi & Haider, 2015), our study focuses on the firm’s initiative data on Twitter. 
Overall, this study contributes to the literature by analyzing social media big data in the 
financial context. 
The next section reviews the relevant literature. The methodology section outlines the 
sample data and model tested. The paper then presents and discusses the empirical results, 
comparing and contrasting them with past literature. The paper concludes by considering the 
theoretical and managerial implications of the empirical evidence.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Information asymmetry, information intermediaries and cost of equity 
 
Cost of equity is the cost to a firm of using investors’ funds that the company raises and 
uses. Previous studies have documented the important role of accounting information in 
reducing a firm’s COE (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Easley & O'hara, 2004).   Some 
attention has been paid to the communication channel used for disseminating firm information 
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and its implications for the COE.  Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) show that disclosing 
management forecasts and conference calls are associated with a higher COE, whereas this 
association is not significant for press releases. Kothari et al. (2009) highlight the role of 
information intermediaries on the COE, finding that it is affected by business press coverage 
for both good and bad news. They find that information reported by management and analysts 
does not provide significant evidence. They also suggest that "technological innovation […] 
and changes in disclosure channels and the number and type of information intermediaries 
that continue to reshape disclosure and financial reporting practices create new and exciting 
opportunities for research" (p. 1667). Such intermediaries create value by being easier to 
manage, and being more efficient and specialised than other media channels (del Águila-Obra, 
Padilla-Meléndez, & Serarols-Tarres, 2007). 
As “the cost of equity capital is increasing in the level of information asymmetry” (Beyer 
et al., 2010, p. 314), making dissemination decisions to spread information through different 
communication channels matters (Drake, Guest, & Twedt, 2014; Twedt, 2016). In essence, 
firms’ dependence on financial intermediaries, such as the press, could be subject to some 
limitation as the press may favour articles about firms that attract a wider audience (Miller, 
2006), which may affect the effectiveness of the firm’s disclosure. Therefore, improving the 
reach and spread of information through dissemination could play a role in enhancing the 
usefulness of corporate disclosure. That is, different degrees of dissemination, apart from 
voluntary disclosure, matter (Drake et al., 2014). Previous studies have found that the 
dissemination level of the business press affects stock prices (E. X. Li et al., 2011), price 
discovery (Twedt, 2016), information asymmetry (Bushee et al., 2010) and the expected rate 
of return (Fang & Peress, 2009). Overall, these findings imply that dissemination has its own 
capital market consequences apart from disclosure. 
 
2.2 Social media and financial dissemination 
 
Social media employ mobile technologies and web-based to create highly interactive 
platforms by which various stakeholders, individuals and communities can create big data by 
sharing, discussing, co-creating, and modifying user-generated content (e.g. Shiau, Dwivedi, 
& Yang, 2017; Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011; Ngai, Tao, & Moon, 
2015). In addition to being user-driven communities, over the past years social media channels 
have provided an enormous amount of timely data that has served many business functions and 
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purposes (Manika, Papagiannidis, & Bourlakis, 2013). When it comes to financial 
dissemination, firms attempt to improve the information environment by initiating investor 
relations (IR) programmes (Agarwal, Taffler, Bellotti, & Nash, 2016), providing information 
through various communication channels. Among these channels are channels supported by 
information technology, such as corporate websites and social media, which have become an 
essential part of IR programmes. For example, firms use their websites to provide information 
(Ettredge, Richardson, & Scholz, 2002) and broadcast conference calls (Bushee, Matsumoto, 
& Miller, 2003) and social media to disseminate corporate announcements (Jung et al., 2018).  
Among the social media platforms, Twitter provides an accessible communication channel 
that enables customers, investors and firms to engage with each other in a two-way 
conversation by posting tweets and receiving comments. For example, from the investor 
perspective, X. Li, Xie, Jiang, Zhou, and Huang (2018) have proposed a framework for 
monitoring emerging technologies and by using patent analysis and Twitter data mining. Such 
monitoring can facilitate early investments and high return on these in due course. Social media 
data has also been used to make stock price predictions (Daniel, Neves, & Horta, 2017) or to 
detect corporate fraud (Xiong, Chapple, & Yin, 2018). From the firms’ perspective, unlike 
other communication channels, Twitter provides a unique mechanism that allows distinctions 
to be made about the effect of firms’ dissemination decisions. Firstly, firms that seek to 
disseminate press releases would send investor-related information to newswire services or 
other information intermediaries (Bushee & Miller, 2012). It is difficult for firms to be certain 
about when or even whether the information would be broadcast to investors. Conversely, firms 
on Twitter have the option to choose the time to distribute investor information. Secondly, 
Twitter makes it possible for firms to know the size of their audience, which may motivate 
firms’ dissemination decisions. Thirdly, the design of Twitter messages suggests that it is more 
likely to use tweets for dissemination rather than distributing comprehensive information. 
Tweets are limited to 140 characters, and often include hyperlinks to full press releases 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014) or quotes from either press releases or conference calls (Jung et al., 
2018). Even though Tweets could be stand-alone pieces of information, Blankespoor et al. 
(2014, p. 81) “find evidence that they are more commonly used as a method of dissemination”. 
Fourth, prior literature has explored various aspects of voluntary disclosure channels (Bushee 
et al., 2003; Ettredge et al., 2002). Twitter provides different mechanisms that support the 
dissemination role. For instance, conference calls are infrequent and are limited to a short 
period, whereas firms can use Twitter more frequently. Also, corporate websites require 
investors to search through the whole website for the desired information, which takes time 
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and effort. In contrast, Twitter does not wait for investors to look for information about the 
firm as it applies ‘push’ technology, which directly reaches investors and reduces the 
acquisition cost of information. Fifth, the spread of tweets can also reach more than the firm's 
followers as Twitter enables the followers to redirect and share tweets with their follower lists, 
through the ‘retweet’ feature. Finally, firms can repeatedly post tweets over days or use 
hashtags (#earnings) or cashtags ($Ticker) that are ideally used to share opinion and spread 
news, which is expected to enhance investor recognition about a firm. All these features enable 
firms to expand the reach of firm disclosure on a timely basis, isolating the effect of 
dissemination from disclosure. Once investors receive and read this information, they can 
become less concerned about information asymmetry. 
As this platform has become popular, researchers have paid more attention to studying the 
market consequences of disseminating information on Twitter. For a list of technology firms, 
Blankespoor et al. (2014) show that dissemination through links to press releases on Twitter 
reduces information asymmetry and improves market liquidity, especially for firms with a 
weaker information environment. In line with this, Prokofieva (2015) finds similar results for 
an Australian sample (100 ASK). Meanwhile, firms are most likely to use Twitter to 
strategically disseminate favourable news (Jung et al., 2018). Firms can also use Twitter to 
attenuate negative market reaction to unfavourable news such as product recall crises (Lee et 
al., 2015), acquisition announcements (Mazboudi & Khalil, 2017) and negative earnings 
surprises (Miller & Skinner, 2015). The attenuation effect suggests that firms that have better 
interaction, response and control to adjust investors’ concerns mitigate the reputation damage 
of negative corporate announcements. As a firm loses control, other users’ tweets may 
aggravate the adverse reaction (Lee et al., 2015). Overall, prior studies generally highlight how 
firms’ dissemination decisions on Twitter in spite of other information intermediaries influence 
the capital market in many aspects (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018). Also, using 
Twitter makes it possible to understand manager behaviour toward dissemination decisions. 
However, prior research (Botosan, 1997) has shown that managers strategically adjust 
disclosure decisions in a way to achieve their goals by increasing firm value and reducing the 
COE. We, therefore, attempt to fill such a gap in the research by studying the impact of the 
firm's dissemination of financial information on the COE. 
 
2.3 iDisc and cost of equity (COE) 
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According to the “market-liquidity hypothesis”, information asymmetry introduces 
adverse selection problem into transactions between market participants, and, therefore, should 
reduce market liquidity in firm shares (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Mangena et al., 2016). Firms are hence issue shares at a discount as investors pay less for shares 
that have high transaction costs (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). Firms alleviate the adverse 
selection problem between the firm and its investors (Verrecchia, 1983) and reduce information 
asymmetries among informed and uninformed investors (O. Kim & Verrecchia, 1994) by 
voluntarily disclosing their information to decrease investors’ incentives to acquire costly 
private information (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991) and increase market participants' demand 
for the firm’s stock, thus lowering the firm’s cost of equity (Beyer et al., 2010; Easley & O'hara, 
2004). However, information about the firm may not reach the public effectively, and greater 
dissemination could play a role in improving the effectiveness of disclosure. As such, Twitter 
allows firms to make their own dissemination decisions and be less dependent on other 
information intermediaries such as the press. That is, iDisc is likely to improve the 
effectiveness of firm information (in turn reducing the COE) by pushing information more 
directly and immediately to a broader reach of market participants, including uninformed 
investors. As investors receive firm information on a timely basis, they become less concerned 
about information asymmetry and thus improve stock liquidity and reduce the cost of equity.  
Recently, Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018 have argued that firms may disseminate 
their information on Twitter to reach many potential investors. Accordingly, the ‘investor 
recognition hypothesis’ suggests that improving investor recognition of the firm will increase 
stock prices and reduce the cost of equity (Lehavy & Sloan, 2008; Merton, 1987). The key 
assumption here is that investors, among all firms, only buy the stocks of firms that they 
recognise. Therefore, stock prices increase when more investors know about the firm. If only 
a small number of investors are aware of the firm’s stock, then these investors will take a larger 
portion of the stock. For this reason, stock with lower investor recognition needs to offer a 
higher rate of return for the risk that investors gain from the large undiversified position. One 
way to enhance investor recognition is to present information to market participants through 
more dissemination channels. Therefore, firms can use iDisc to improve the breadth of their 
information. As information is widely disseminated, investor awareness of the firm’s news 
increases, which improves investors’ risk sharing and reduces the cost of equity. In addition, 
the value of dissemination rises when investors become aware of the stock, by reducing the 
acquisition costs that investors gain from their limited time and attention to firm disclosure 
(Hirshleifer, Lim, & Teoh, 2009; Hong & Stein, 1999). Such costs limit the information that 
- 8 - 
 
investors process from corporate disclosure and make them mainly depend on a limited number 
of communication channels (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). For this reason, firms attempt to 
improve the dissemination of corporate disclosure in many information intermediaries such as 
Twitter (Blankespoor et al., 2014). Such an improvement of dissemination is expected to 
provide investors with information about the firm at a lower acquisition cost, which reduces 
the information asymmetry and hence reduces the cost of equity.  
Based on the above, we conjecture that a higher use of iDisc is predicted to enhance 
investors’ reach with the firm information. This is likely to reduce the gap between informed 
and uninformed investors. As firms rely more on the use of iDisc to disseminate news, investors 
can receive the news at a low acquisition cost and with better investor recognition. Thereby, a 
higher level of iDisc use is expected to reduce COE.  
H1: There is a significant negative association between iDisc and the cost of equity (COE). 
 
While we argue that disseminating financial information (iDisc) on Twitter improves a 
firm’s information environment to reduce the cost of equity by enhancing firm connection and 
information availability and accessibility to investors, the firm’s information environment is 
also affected by other factors such firm size, book-to-market ratio (BTM) and financial leverage 
(LEV). Larger sized firms have a better information environment (Gebhardt et al., 2001) and 
expect to have lower costs of equity (Botosan, 1997; Dhaliwal, Heitzman, & Zhen Li, 2006; 
Mangena et al., 2016, whereas smaller firms have a lower information environment, lower 
liquidity and hence expect to have a higher COE. Therefore, firm size (SIZE) is expect to have 
a negative association with COE.  
H2: There is a significant negative association between firm size (SIZE) and the cost of 
equity (COE). 
 
In addition, the book to market ratio (BTM) reflects the difference in firm accounting 
conservatism and investment opportunities (Hail & Leuz, 2006). This variable is considered a 
risk factor (Easton, 2004; Mangena et al., 2016). That is, firms with a higher BTM ratio are 
undervalued in price and should have a higher risk premium (Fama & French, 1992; Gode & 
Mohanram, 2003). In this sense, we expect the book-to-market ratio (BTM) to be positively 
associated with COE. 
H3: There is a significant positive association between firm book-to-market (BTM) and the 
cost of equity (COE). 
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According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms that use more financial leverage face 
greater financial uncertainty and expect to have higher risk premiums. Firms with a high 
leverage ratio may face more liquidity risk that arise from limiting their ability to meet their 
obligations. Furthermore, those firms may also encounter more restrictions in their ability to 
access external funds, which in turn might affect the analyst evaluation from the credit rating 
perspective. Therefore, firms with higher debt on their capital structure may have a higher cost 
of equity (Cao et al. 2015; Dhaliwal et al, 2006; Fama & French, 1992). We, therefore, expect 
a positive association between LEV and COE. 
H4: There is a significant positive association between firm financial leverage (LEV) and 
the cost of equity (COE). 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the information environment due to wider dispersion of 
analysts' forecasts is expected to increase firm risk (Gode & Mohanram, 2003; Kothari et al., 
2009a). That is, wider dispersion or disagreement in analysts' forecasts implies greater 
uncertainty about earnings forecasts (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kim, & Park, 2018; Guedhami & 
Mishra, 2009), implying a greater risk for the firm information environment and hence a higher 
cost of equity. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between dispersion analyst (DISP) 
and cost of equity (COE). 
H5: There is a significant positive association between firm analysts' forecast dispersion 
(DISP) and the cost of equity (COE). 
 
Under the capital asset market pricing model, investors expect a higher required rate of 
return as systematic risks become higher. Systematic risk or market beta (BETA) is an 
undiversifiable risk that increases the firm risk premium (Botosan, 1997; Botosan, Plumlee, & 
Wen, 2011; Cao et al., 2015; El Ghoul et al., 2011). As the risk increases, the certainty that 
investors expect to earn from their investment will become smaller, which, in-turn, increases 
their required return on their investment. Consequently, firms with high systematic risk (BETA) 
are expected to have a higher COE. 
H6: There is a significant positive association between firm systematic risk (BETA) and the 
cost of equity (COE). 
 
Prior literature (Cao et al., 2015; Guedhami & Mishra, 2009) indicates that firms with a high 
long-term growth rate (LTG) are considered riskier and have more uncertainty than lower LTG 
firms. Thai is, high prospect about firm growth and earnings may result in the inflation of stock 
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prices and that any misestimating of growth rate can have a significant effect on the share price 
(Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2011; Gode & Mohanram, 2003). Therefore, the market perceives a firm 
with high LTG as a high-risk investment and hence they expect a higher cost of equity. 
Therefore, we predict a positive association between LTG and COE. 
H7: There is a significant positive association between the long term growth forecast (LTG) 
and the cost of equity (COE). 
 
While media coverage may shape the firm information environment, which is expected to 
influence the expected rate of return, the press may contain additional information and favour 
a direction of news stories that could influence the firm valuation and cost of equity (Fang & 
Peress, 2009; Jung et al., 2014; Niessner & So, 2017). Kothari et al. (2009a) find that media 
coverage increases the firm's cost of equity when the news is negative, whereas positive news 
reduces the equity financing. Therefore, we do not provide any certain direction between media 
coverage (NEWS) and COE. 
H8: There is no significant association between media coverage (NEWS) and the cost of 
equity (COE). 
 
The existence of institutional investors enhances the monitoring role on firm management, 
exerting more pressure on them to provide better information quality, transparency and 
management practices (Attig, Cleary, El Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2012; Elyasiani & Jia, 2010). 
This enhancement of the monitoring and information role reduces the agency problem and 
information asymmetry between market participants and hence reduces the cost of equity (see 
Attig, Cleary, El Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2013; Elyasiani, Jia, & Mao, 2010). Therefore, we 
expect that high institutional holdings are likely to enrich the firm public information 
environment, reducing the uncertainty and thus reducing the cost of equity. 
H9: There is a significant negative association between firm institutional holdings 
(INSTOWN) and the cost of equity (COE). 
 
Firm managers may have an incentive not to miss earnings expectations. Previous studies 
(Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 2004) have argued that earnings surprise can be costly to the firm 
as analysts would not prefer to follow firms with an earnings surprise. That is, an earnings 
surprise may cause an analyst's forecast to be inaccurate, which is not preferable for many 
analysts, resulting in lower analyst coverage and thus a lower information environment. In 
other words, an earnings surprise reflects the uncertainty surrounding the current earnings, 
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which imposes a higher risk and is expected to increase the cost of equity (El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Kim & Shi, 2011; Rogers, Skinner, & Van Buskirk, 2009). Therefore, we expect earning 
surprise (SURP) to be possibly associated with the cost of equity (COE). 
H10: There is a significant positive association between earnings surprise (SURP) and the 
cost of equity (COE). 
 
Finally, firms with better performance, stable profitability and increase in earnings are 
expected to have lower uncertainty and less exposure to default risk (e.g. El Ghoul et al., 2018; 
Francis, Khurana, & Pereira, 2005; Gode & Mohanram, 2003). Previous studies (Bowman, 
1979; Francis et al., 2005) indicate that default risk is positively associated with equity risk, 
which is a result of an increase in the cost of equity. Thus, we expect a negative association 
between return on assets (ROA) as a measure of firm profitability and COE. 
H11: There is a significant negative association between return on assets (ROA) and the cost 
of equity (COE). 
 
In figure 1, we show the effect of our explanatory variables on COE.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and data 
 
Our initial sample includes non-financial firms listed on the US NASDAQ stock exchange 
that have official Twitter accounts. Our sample focuses on the US because foreign firms have 
different information environments, and the dissimilarities in transparency can influence the 
COE. The SEC, the regulator of the US stock markets, allows firms to use social media such 
as Twitter for disclosing financial information that complies with Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Dorminey, Dull, & Schaupp, 2015). US firms have shown frequent adoption of Twitter and 
early use for corporate announcements (Jung et al., 2018; Zhou, Lei, Wang, Fan, & Wang, 
2014), which ensured a potential coverage during our sample period. Consistent with Bushee 
et al. (2010), we mainly focus our sample on one stock exchange to remove any effect of 
exchange listing.  
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We focus on 2009-2015, even though Twitter was founded in March 2006, because Twitter 
accounts’ popularity grew among its users around 2009 (Marwick & Boyd, 2011). We also 
exclude tweets before 2009 to avoid the macroeconomic effects of the financial crisis (2007-
2008), limited Twitter activity (approximately less than 10% of our sample had Twitter 
accounts before 2009), and limited use of cashtags in Twitter before 2009. 
Our data collection strategy is based on identifying whether each firm in the sample has a 
Twitter account, using a number of checks (e.g. whether they had the Blue Verified Twitter 
Badge). After identifying Twitter adopter firms, we check whether these firms have positive 
median earnings forecasts for one and two years ahead to measure the implied COE. These 
consensus earnings forecasts are collected as of June to ensure that analysts had incorporated 
all the information from fiscal year reports in their forecasts. Firms with missing observations 
on the COE are excluded from the sample. These restrictions reduce the sample size to 791 
firms (4,131 firm-year observations).  
Corporate adoption of Twitter does not necessarily mean using their Twitter accounts for 
disseminating financial information (iDisc). We, therefore, use two sources to download the 
full texts of tweets to identify iDisc. We retrieve Twitter data from both Twitter’s application 
programming interface (API) and Twitter’s advanced search. Twitter API provides a maximum 
number of tweets (up to 3,200 tweets). Tweets beyond 3,200 are, therefore, manually collected 
through Twitter’s advanced search function. Manual collection is performed to obtain tweets 
between the last collected tweets from Twitter API and the first tweet published by the firm’s 
account. If the number of tweets is large, we use the advanced search option to search for 
financial keywords. We used keywords that related to financial capital, balance sheet items, 
equity and debt financing, financial ratio and financial reporting and announcement (discussed 
further in Measuring iDisc). The total number of tweets collected is 1,197,208 tweets, 
approximately 2/3 of which come from Twitter API. The mean (median) value of the number 
of tweets is 4,588 (944), which suggests that the total number of collected tweets is not 
particularly large. We process these tweets through a matching classification scheme to 
quantify iDisc tweets.1 
                                                 
1 The classification process followed several steps: (1) we uploaded the data to the Python software programme; 
(2) we read all these data; (3) we applied “stop words”, which is a process used to remove words that have no 
meaning in the text (e.g. “a”, “the”, “and”); (4) we divided tweets into words by applying a technique to split the 
text into separate words; (5) we matched the word in each tweet with our financial keyword list ; (6) we gave a 
value of 1 to every tweet that matched with our list of keywords; (7) we downloaded the data into an Excel file 
for tweets that matched our classifications. 
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In addition to Twitter data, we collected all news articles that mentioned the firm’s name 
from LexisNexis. This database includes major news media channels such as Wall Street 
Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post and USA Today. We used company 
identifiers to allocate all firm news in the database. We define news coverage as the total 
number of news articles about the firm. In addition, we obtained accounting and market data 
to measure the dependent and explanatory variables from Bloomberg and DataStream. The 
distribution of the sample shows high skewness from the medians for COE, LEV, DISP, 
BETA, LTG and ROA. These high skewnesses suggest the existence of outliers, which may 
mislead the interpretation of the estimated coefficient. To control for the outliers, we 
winsorize all these variables at the 2.5th to 97.5th percentiles. Consistently with previous 
literature (Botosan et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2009), we winsorize the COE to lie between 0 
and 0.6 as investors are not expected to require negative rates of return and high COE could 
be driven by outliers.  
 
3.2 Measuring iDisc  
 
We focus on financially related information (iDisc-related tweets), as financial information 
is important to investors and firms are mandated to disclose this information but are not 
required to disseminate it on Twitter. This makes it possible to distinguish the effect of 
dissemination from disclosure (Jung et al., 2018). To identify iDisc tweets from big data of 
firm tweets, we search for the existence of financial information by combining several sets of 
financial keywords or using single phrases. For instance, we use the following keywords and 
phrases to look for earnings-related tweets: 
 
(“earning”, “revenue*”, “profit*”, “income”, “loss*”, “sales”, “dividend”, “financial”) 
AND (“disclos*”, “report*”, “record*”, “perform*”, “statement*” “release*”, “announce”, 
“quarter”, “annual”, “result*”) 
 
We also use other financial keywords that relate to financial reporting, stock prices, balance 
sheet items and their variants such as:  
 
(“annual report*”, “annual statement*”, “press release*”, “balance sheet”, “cash flow”, “cash 
inflow”, “total assets”, “current assets”, “total liabilit*”, “current liabilit*”, “long term assets”, 
“long term debt”, “net income*”, “net profit*”, “capital gain”, “net loss*”, “capital loss”, 
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“capital expenditure*”, “market capital*”, “stock pric*”, “secur* pric*”, “share* pric*”, 
“merger”, “acquisition”, “earnings per share”, “stock* repurchase”, “share* repurchase”, 
“stock* offering”, “share* offering”) 
 
The development of financial keyword lists starts with identifying words used in previous 
studies (Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Kothari et al., 2009a; Kravet & Muslu, 
2013; Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 2011). The strategy of developing word lists includes 
searching and adding other synonyms for financial words through WordNet and other 
dictionary software applications. Additional terms and synonyms have been added from 
Campbell Harvey’s financial glossary lists (Harvey, 1999). Terms or words that relate to firm 
activity, reporting, announcements and disclosure were included in the lists. To reduce the 
classification error, we look for the existence of multiple words in the same tweet.  
In addition, Twitter provides features that firms can use to push information regarding any 
event or topic by using the hash key (#). These hashtags can be used for earnings 
announcements or quarter earnings events. Twitter also makes it possible for users and firms 
to discuss and disseminate a firm’s financial information through the cashtag key feature 
($ticker). Thus, we also included hashtags that are used for firm announcements and cashtags 
in our keywords list, such as:  
 
(“#earnings”, “#quarterearnings”, “#annualreport*”, “#pressrelease”, #Q12014, e.g. $AAPL 
for Apple inc). 
 
Tweets that match with our list of keywords are quantified as iDisc tweets. Our analysis 
examines the annual number of iDisc tweets for each firm in our sample period. 
 
3.3 The empirical model  
 
To examine the impact of iDisc and other explanatory variables on the implied cost of equity 
premium we employ the following Model (1): 
 
COEit =  β0 + β1iDiscit + β2 SIZEit + β3 BTMit +  β4 LEV +  β5 DISPit +
 β6 BETAit +  β7 LTGit +  β8 NEWSit  +  β9 INSTOWNit +
 β10 SURPit +  β11 ROAit +  β12 ∑ Tt
2009
t=2015 + β13 vi + εit  (1) 
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The dependent variable in this model (COE) is the implied COE, which is estimated as the 
average of four equity premium estimates: (i) Claus and Thomas model, RCT (2001); (ii) 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan model, RGLS (2001); (iii) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
model, ROJ (2005); and (iv) Easton model, RMPEG (2004). The use of an average of these 
measures was aimed at reducing the estimation errors (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Dhaliwal, Judd, 
Serfling, & Shaikh, 2016; Hail & Leuz, 2006). The implied COE is a good measure for the 
COE, because it attempts to differentiate the effect of growth and cash flow from the COE 
(Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009). Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008) also indicate that the 
implied COE is a useful estimate for the time-series variation of expected returns.  
iDisc reflects the number of financial tweets. This measure is computed by employing the 
words, phrases and combined word classification. We cluster tweets based on the existence of 
specified words or phrases. We only count tweets that matched the criteria for measuring iDisc 
or set this to zero otherwise. Our variables also include firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio 
(BTM), financial leverage (LEV), the dispersion of analysts forecast (DISP), systematic risk 
(BETA), long-term growth rate (LTG), press coverage (NEWS), institutional holdings 
(INSTOWN), earnings surprise (SURP) and return on assets (ROA). In addition to iDisc, these 
variables are related to firm characteristics, analysts' forecast attribute, systematic risk, 
information intermediaries, content of information and firm profitability. In Table 1, we list all 
our independent variables and their direction with COE. Additionally, full descriptions of the 
variables and measurements are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B provides all the model 
measurements and descriptions for measuring COE. In addition, we include both year and 
industry fixed effects in the regressions using the Fama-French 12-industry classification. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Our estimation procedures utilised pooled cross-sectional regressions with robust standard 
error clustered at the firm level to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Cao et 
al., 2015; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kim, & Park, 2018; Petersen, 2009).2 To mitigate potential 
endogeneity between iDisc and the COE (Nikolaev & Van Lent, 2005), we utilise a two-stage 
                                                 
2 The Breusch-Pagan test shows significant results (p-value = 0.000; 0.031; 0.000 respectively), indicating the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. 
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least square model (2SLS) with clustered standard error at the firm level.3 We use non-iDisc 
tweets in the previous year (LagPriortweet) as the instrumental variable in line with prior social 
media and business press literature (Drake et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015). This instrumental 
variable is related to iDisc and is not directly related to the COE. In addition, LagPriortweet 
captured the prior tendency of firm activity and responsiveness in their Twitter account, which 
is likely to be correlated to iDisc. This measure also represents the amount that corporate firms 
added to their Twitter accounts. The results of the partial square are higher than 0.22, and the 
F statistic was greater than the critical value of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1994). Also, the association 
between LagPriortweet and iDisc is positive and significant, which is consistent with our 
prediction and the previous literature (Lee et al., 2015). 
4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table (2)-Panel (A) reports the percentage of firms that have adopted Twitter and use iDisc 
in our sample. Results show that over 66% of firms used iDisc at least once in our sample 
period and 44% of the firms have disseminated financial information over Twitter at least for 
three years. This finding is comparable with Jung et al. (2018), who found that more than 57% 
of firms that have a Twitter account disclose earnings-related tweets. Panel (B) shows that the 
percentage use of each iDisc class varies across the years and the average number of tweets per 
year. We find that the mean number of iDisc tweets of the full sample is, on average, seven 
tweets per year per firm. Results show that the number of such tweets grows substantially over 
time, which offers some primary highlights about the role of Twitter in the dissemination of 
financial information by firms. This can be justified through the SEC guidance, in April 2013, 
which motivates firms to use Twitter for dissemination purposes (Dorminey et al., 2015). In 
addition, results show that financial reporting tweets are the dominant type of iDisc, two-thirds 
of iDisc being related to financial reporting, which far exceeded other types. This finding is 
consistent with Jung et al. (2018), who found a higher number of tweets related to the earnings 
releases. Our results also show that 7%, 21%, and 15% of iDisc tweets were related to 
financing, financial terms, and financial ratio respectively. 
 
                                                 
3 To test for the endogeneity, we ran the Durbin Wu-Hausman test. The results show an F test (P-value) of 1.54 
(0.215), suggesting that endogeneity is prevalent. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of iDisc activity based on the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification. The distribution of iDisc tends to be heterogeneous across industries. The highest 
use during the whole sample period is prevalent in the business equipment industry. For this 
industry, at least half of the companies used iDisc once, which represents approximately 37% 
of the total number of firms that use iDisc. This result is expected given that firms in the 
business equipment industry are more likely to adopt this new communication channel 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014). Although the oil and gas industry shows a high reliance on iDisc, 
consistent with Jung et al. (2018), the percentage of iDisc tweets is rather low as compared to 
other sectors, with a low concentration for the number of firms. In contrast, firms in food, 
tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather and toys classifications tend to focus more on non-financial 
information. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables considered. The summary statistics 
of the dependent variables show that the mean estimate of COE is 5.1%, which is in line with 
the prior evidence (Attig et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). COE is based 
on four estimates: ROJ, RMPEG, RCT and RGLS. In comparison, ROJ, RCT and RGLS show higher 
premiums than COE of 6.7%, 5.8% and 10.2% respectively, whereas a lower premium of 4.4% 
is associated with RMPEG.  The mean of firm size (SIZE) is 20.25, and the unreported mean 
(median) of firm size is $4106.6 million ($562.8 million). The mean (median) of book-to-
market (BTM) equals -1.374 (-1.029). Sample firms have a mean financial leverage (LEV) of 
16%. The median of dispersion (DISP), systemic risk (BETA) and the long consensus forecast 
of earnings estimates (LTG) are 9.3%, 1.15% and 15% respectively. Also, the mean and median 
of BETA are greater than one, which indicates that the sample consists of firms that have higher 
systematic risk than the market. These results are comparable to prior studies (Cao et al., 2015). 
Additionally, the average news coverage (NEWS) is 5.557, and approximately 77% of firms 
are owned by institutional owners (INSTOWN). The mean average of earnings surprise (SURP) 
is equal to 0.365, which is in line with (Chen et al., 2011). However, the mean of the 
profitability measure (ROA) is negative (7%), compared to a positive median of 2.2%. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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The Spearman and Pearson correlation matrix is presented in Table 5 for all the variables at 
the 10% significance level. The correlation matrix shows a significant and negative correlation 
between COE and iDisc. This finding provides a preliminary conclusion that firms which use 
iDisc have a lower COE. Results indicate that smaller (larger) sized firms have a higher (lower) 
COE. High risk, measured by BTM, LEV, DISP, BETA, LTG and SURP, is associated with high 
risk-premiums. Richer information environment variables (NEWS and INSTOWN) are 
negatively correlated with COE. Overall, correlations between COE and the other independent 
variables are in line with expectations and previous studies (Orens et al. 2010; Cao et al. 2015; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Moreover, in Table 5 iDisc is negatively correlated with BTM, LEV, 
BETA, LTG, INSTOWN and ROA, but is positively correlated with SIZE, DISP, NEWS and 
SURP. These correlations suggest that enhanced iDisc alleviates the uncertainty and risk 
factors. The positive correlation between firm SIZE and iDisc indicates that larger firms publish 
more iDisc tweets. Furthermore, firms with a higher rate of news (NEWS) use iDisc more. 
These correlations, together, suggest that firms with lower uncertainty are more likely to release 
financial information on Twitter. In addition, the results show that lower return on asset (ROA) 
firms use iDisc more frequently. Considering both the Spearman and Pearson correlation 
matrix and unreported VIF tests indicates that multicollinearity is not dominant across our 
explanatory variables. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 
 
4.2 Empirical results 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the two estimation models (i.e., OLS in column 1 and 2SLS in 
column 2) for the association between iDisc and COE. Results show a negative and statistically 
significant association between iDisc and COE (p < 0.05) in OLS and (p < 0.1) in 2SLS.4 Our 
results show that the economic significance of iDisc is -0.14%, which means that if iDisc 
                                                 
4 The reduction in sample size is due to the additional data requirements. To check whether our results are affected 
by missing data, we also ran the regression with the lagged iDisc as the instrumental variable. The Lagged iDisc 
can be an appropriate instrument as it is less likely to affect the cost of equity once year later. The Hausman test 
is 0.79, with first stage partial square equal to 0.52. Our main results remain unchanged. 
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tweeting increases by 50%, the COE is expected to change by -0.07%. However, the finding 
suggests that firms that disseminate more financial information (iDisc) have a lower COE. This 
implies that firms’ decisions to engage in broader dissemination actions through iDisc promote 
financial benefits for both investors and managers. That is, investors can receive a firm’s 
information at a lower acquisition cost and managers are able to alleviate the information 
asymmetry as well as enhance investor recognition. Although tweets are not expected to have 
comprehensive information, the results show that iDisc can still reduce COE, which supports 
our hypothesis. This finding is in line with our expectation that the effect of tweets should be 
small as it is less likely to have rich information. However, tweets provide an accessible (open) 
use for managers at lower costs, efficient timings and better control. This finding is consistent 
with other communication mechanisms such as corporate websites and open conference calls 
that firms can use to disseminate their information to the public openly (Orens et al., 2010; 
Zhao, Davis, & Berry, 2009). Nevertheless, these channels are used as primary channels for 
disclosing corporate information whereas Twitter is used for dissemination of information. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
With respect to other variables, across the two columns, we find a negative coefficient on 
firm size (SIZE) and positive coefficients on the book-to-market ratio (BTM) and financial 
leverage (LEV), which is consistent with hypotheses H2, H3 and H4. Additionally, COE tends 
to significantly increase systematic risk (BETA), with positive coefficients, which is consistent 
with our prediction in H6. These findings suggest that firms with higher uncertainty are 
associated with a higher required rate of return. The coefficient on LTG is positive and 
significant, which supports hypothesis H7, indicating that the market perceives high growth 
firms as riskier. News coverage (NEWS) shows a positive association, which suggests that more 
news coverage, which is not under the firm's control, increases the COE, rejecting the null 
hypothesis H8. That is, firms with higher media coverage face more risk than lower coverage 
firms. These firms have higher stakeholder pressure as they are exposed to more stakeholder 
groups (Zyglidopoulos, Georgiadis, Carroll, & Siegel, 2012). They also have higher levels of 
scrutiny from stakeholders, which makes them more vulnerable to campaign targets (Friedman, 
1991; Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). In addition, previous literature (Niessner & So, 
2017) found that media coverage may favour negative news. Therefore, firms with more news 
coverage could face higher risks of getting into difficulties when the media provide misshaping 
or negative news, which consequently increases the COE capital (Kothari et al., 2009a). The 
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coefficient on earnings surprise (SURP) in column (2) is significantly positive, suggesting that 
firms that have higher optimism about analysts’ earnings forecasts have a greater COE (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011), which confirms hypothesis H10. However, our results show no association 
for DISP, INSTOWN and ROA. 
 
4.3 The firm visibility effect 
 
Firms seek to attract investor attention, as well as reduce investor acquisition costs, by 
disseminating information through many information intermediaries (Hirshleifer et al., 2009; 
Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). If firms with low press coverage rely on a small number of 
communication channels which are reasonably affordable, there is a high chance that investors 
will not receive news about the firm on a real-time basis. Therefore, low (high) visible firms 
are less (more) likely be frequently observed by market participants, and, hence, lower (higher) 
investor recognition and higher (lower) COE are likely (Merton, 1987). Accordingly, low 
visibility firms might have a higher need to disseminate firm news and, hence, rely more on 
iDisc. Under these scenarios, iDisc will help firms improve firm visibility and be less 
dependent on other information intermediaries, by voluntarily making dissemination decisions 
and directly approaching market participants promptly (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 
2018). As such, we predict that the impact of iDisc on the implied COE is more pronounced 
for less visible as compared to more visible firms. 
To measure firm visibility, we have used firm size (SIZE), analyst following (ANALYSTS) 
and the number of investors (LNOWN) as proxies for a firm's visibility, where the upper quartile 
(lower three quartiles) is used to proxy for highly visible (low visible) firms. These proxies are 
in line with Merton (1987), who argues that there is a stronger effect of investor recognition 
for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk. That is to say, firms with a smaller size, low analyst 
following, and a limited number of investors are less visible to market participants (Agarwal 
et al., 2016). Although firms may issue voluntary disclosure to attract market participants, 
smaller sized firms are likely to be neglected and may not be able to benefit from such actions 
(Bushee & Miller, 2012). To overcome this concern, some firms attempt to initiate investor 
relation programmes to attract investor recognition and analyst followings (Bushee & Miller, 
2012). This is likely to provide valuable communication sources to mid-size and/or small firms, 
given that large a analyst following is associated with an increased demand for the firm's stock, 
which as a result improves the firm's value (Agarwal et al., 2016). Also, previous research 
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(Lehavy & Sloan, 2008) has argued that firm value is positively associated with the investor 
base.  
We partitioned the full sample into high and low visibility firms under each variable, and 
the results are presented in Table 7 using OLS and 2SLS estimations with clustered standard 
errors at the firm level. The findings provide strong evidence that lower-visibility firms use 
iDisc to reduce their COE, with significant and negative coefficients reported under columns 
3, 4, 6 and 8 (p < 0.05, p < 0.1, p < 0.01 and p < 0.1 respectively). These findings are also 
consistent with prior studies which show that the effect of investor recognition is more 
pronounced for small-sized firms (Agarwal et al., 2016; Blankespoor et al., 2014; Merton, 
1987). Additional evidence suggests that corporate disclosure reduces the COE for firms with 
low information certainty, low analyst following and a limited number of investors (Botosan, 
1997; Orens et al., 2010). In contrast, we find that high-visibility firms with high investor 
awareness tend not to rely on iDisc to reduce the COE and consistently show insignificant 
associations with COE. This might be attributable to large firms having more analysts 
following them and a larger number of shareholders. Accordingly, these firms seem to benefit 
from other channels of dissemination and may be reached by more traditional information 
intermediaries. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that broader dissemination 
to the public on Twitter improves firm visibility, which leads to better recognition and lower 
cost of equity, consistent with prior literature (Agarwal et al., 2016; Blankespoor et al., 2014; 
Cao et al. 2015; Lehavy & Sloan, 2008). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.4 The effect of news magnitude and content  
 
Firms are likely to have incentives to disclose good news rather than bad news to positively 
affect their stock value (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, firms are expected to increase their 
dissemination of good news on Twitter, rather than negative news. Nevertheless, firms could 
also use Twitter to attenuate the effect of unfavourable firm announcements such as negative 
earnings surprise (Miller & Skinner, 2015) or product recall (Lee et al., 2015). As such, we 
conjecture that firms that miss analysts’ forecasts have less incentive to use iDisc as compared 
to those with a positive earnings surplus. We expect that voluntary disclosure could be used to 
match managers’ and market expectations (Matsumoto, 2002).  
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To examine the effect of news magnitude (i.e. negative/positive earnings surprises) on the 
conditional use of iDisc to reduce the COE we utilize our base Model (1) to additionally control 
for the absolute earnings surprise (|SURP|) as an indicator variable for negative earnings 
surprise (NegSURP), which takes the value of one when SURP is negative and zero otherwise. 
We also include two interaction variables between absolute earnings surprise with iDisc 
(|SURP| * iDisc) and negative earnings surprise (|SURP| * NegSURP). Therefore, we specify 
Model (2) as follows: 
 
COEit =  β0 + β1iDiscit + β2 |SURP| it + β3 NegSURPit +  β4 |SURP| it ∗
iDiscit +  β5 |SURP| it ∗ NegSURPit +  β6 SIZEit +  β7 BTMit +
 β8 LEV + β9 DISPit +  β10 BETAit +  β11 LTGit +  β12 NEWSit  +
 β13 INSTOWNit +  β14 ROAit +  β15 ∑ Tt
2009
t=2015 + β16 vi +  εit  
 (2) 
Since firms have the option to use Twitter, firms may use iDisc to provide more positive 
than negative news (Jung et al. 2017). Therefore, we extend our analysis to identify the effect 
of news content on the conditional use of iDisc to reduce the COE. Previous literature (Kothari 
et al., 2009a) has studied the effect of the disclosure’s content by different information sources 
on the COE. They found different impacts on COE depending on the source (management, 
analysts and business press) and the content of the disclosure (favourable and unfavourable 
news). Johnstone (2016) also argues that the effect of financial reporting on the COE is subject 
to the direction of the report (what the report says). That is, bad information increases the 
uncertainty of future expected payoff and hence increases the COE. However, good news 
provides higher certainty of future cash flow and, thus, reduces the COE. To examine our 
predictions, using our base Model (1), we additionally include TONE as a proxy for iDisc 
contents and its interaction with iDisc (TONE_ iDisc). This measure aims to reflect whether 
iDisc tweets provide positive and negative meaning. We used Loughran and McDonald 
dictionary lists (2011) to identify the positive and negative words of iDisc tweets. We measured 
the TONE as the difference between positive and negative words divided by the sum of positive 
and negative words. Accordingly, our model (3) is specified as: 
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COEit =  β0 + β1iDiscit + β2 TONEit +  β3 TONEit ∗  iDiscit + β4 SIZEit +
 β5 BTMit +  β6 LEV +  β7 DISPit +  β8 BETAit +  β9 LTGit +
 β10 NEWSit  +  β11 INSTOWNit + β12 SURPit +  β13 ROAit +
 β14 ∑ Tt
2009
t=2015 + β15 vi +  εit  (3) 
 
We estimated Models (2) and (3) using OLS and the results are reported in Table 8. The 
result from Model (2) shows that the dissemination of financial information on Twitter (iDisc) 
is significantly associated with a lower COE even after controlling for the magnitude of the 
news. The results show that the coefficient of iDisc is equal to negative 0.13%, which indicates 
that increasing iDisc tweets by 100% (in our average the sample number of tweets across firms 
and years studied was 7) reduces the COE by 0.13%.  Although this may be a relatively small 
increase in % terms, this was a result of a very small number of posted messages. Increasing 
them can result in a high return of the time and effort put into systematically engaging investors. 
The coefficients of |SURP|, NegSURP, |SURP| * iDisc and |SURP| * NegSURP are not 
statistically significant. These results are consistent with Jung et al. (2018), who found an 
insignificant result by using the total number of the firm’s followers, and with the idea that the 
dissemination of firm initiated information may improve the information environment. The 
findings highlight the important role of iDisc, which extends beyond the type of news. 
Concerning the effect of news content, results for Model (3) provide evidence that the TONE 
of the news does not drive the negative association between COE and iDisc. Both the level and 
interaction variables for TONE show insignificant associations with COE. That is, firms’ 
managers may benefit from iDisc even with unfavourable news. The overall findings provide 
limited support for the influence of news magnitude and news content on information 
dissemination through iDisc. These findings support our main findings and are in line with 
predictions. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.5 The effect of providing additional information and the reach of iDisc 
 
 In this section, we examine the association between iDisc on COE by considering different 
measures of iDisc and COE. First, we count the iDisc tweets that include hyperlinks, as this 
allows users to acquire more information from websites by following the posted link 
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(Blankespoor et al., 2014). Finally, we employ an alternative COE measure, RPEG (Easton, 
2004), based on long-term horizon estimates. Across different measures of COE, Botosan et 
al. (2011) find that RPEG, which assumes no dividend payment, is a valid proxy for COE. They 
state that RPEG is a reliable measure “associated with firm-specific risk characteristics in a 
theoretically predictable and stable manner” (p. 1085). Empirical studies on the relationship 
between corporate disclosure and the COE also use RPEG as a proxy for COE (J. W. Kim & 
Shi, 2011; Mangena et al., 2016). The findings are presented in Table 9 and show that 
iDisc_Hyperlink is negatively and significantly associated with COE. This implies that tweets 
which permit more access to information or are diffused to extend to potential investors 
considerably reduce the COE.  The results in column (2) show a significant and negative 
association between RPEG (as an alternative measure of COE), which is consistent with our 
main findings.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
4.6 Controlling for information quality and other firm characteristics 
 
In Table 10, we further check the robustness of our main results by controlling for a set of 
other variables in Model (1). First, we use discretionary accruals, based on Jones's model 
(Demirkan, Radhakrishnan, & Urcan, 2012; Francis et al., 2008), as a proxy for information 
quality. Previous literature (Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2011) has argued that 
information quality has both direct and indirect (through information asymmetry) effects on 
the COE. Francis et al. (2008) find that the impact of financial information on the COE becomes 
insignificant after controlling for information precision. Theoretical models (Lambert et al., 
2007) indicate that information asymmetry does not affect the COE after controlling for 
information quality. In column (1), we, therefore, incorporate discretionary accruals. Second, 
following previous research (Jung et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2015), we include an indication of 
the social media adoption of financial reporting, namely advertising intensity 
(ADVERTISING). This is calculated as total advertising expense divided by the total sales. 
Even though firms with high advertising expenses are more likely to have a Twitter account, 
firms that spend less on advertising tend to use Twitter for announcement purposes (Jung et 
al., 2018). We also control for whether a firm headquarters is located in Silicon Valley 
(SILICON) and whether the firm’s manager is younger than the median age (CEOAGE). Firms 
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that are located in Silicon Valley and have younger managers are more likely to adopt social 
media platforms (Lee et al., 2015). Finally, the implied COE is measured by using earnings 
estimates of analysts’ forecasts as a prediction of market expectations. Using these estimates 
might be subject to criticism as the poor market expectation by analysts may bias the implied 
COE estimates. Accordingly, previous studies suggest controlling for analysts’ sluggishness 
forecasts by including price momentum (Chen et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). We, 
therefore, include the price momentum (MMT), measured as the compounded rate of return of 
the previous 6 and 12 months.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
The results in column (1) suggest that the negative effects of iDisc on COE is not affected 
by information quality, whereas discretionary accruals (ACCRUAL) are insignificant. This 
finding supports the incremental role of dissemination for corporate disclosure (Blankespoor 
et al., 2014; Fang & Peress, 2009), rather than the quality of information. When controlling for 
the effect of social media indicators, in column (2) we find a negatively significant association 
between iDisc and COE, while the three indicators of social media ADVERTISING, SILICON 
and CEOAGE report insignificant associations with COE.5 These results alleviate any concern 
regarding the willingness to adopt social media and the implications of the use of iDisc. Finally, 
the results in columns (3&4) show that the two indicators of momentum are negatively and 
significantly associated with COE, which is consistent with prior research (Chen et al., 2009). 
These findings suggest that the noise of analysts' forecasts does not drive our results. The 
negative and significant association between iDisc and COE is robust, which suggests that our 
main findings are not affected by analysts’ noise. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The amount of real-time data, “big data”, on social media has attracted various practices 
among many firms due to its application and involvement in people's daily life, resulting in a 
great deal of attention and business change (e.g. Raguseo, 2018). Social media such as Twitter 
has become a popular channel for many firms to disseminate financial information by directly 
                                                 
5 The decrease in the number of observations is due to missing variables. 
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reaching investors promptly. This study has examined the association between firms’ 
dissemination decisions about financial information and the COE. Overall, the findings support 
the idea that firms can use Twitter to improve the communication with investors, which reduces 
the time and energy of acquiring news about the firm, reduces information asymmetry and 
enhances investor recognition and firm visibility.  
 More specifically, the study has made a number of theoretical contributions. Firstly, using 
the implied COE as a proxy for COE, we find that iDisc is significantly and negatively 
associated with the COE. The results indicate that firms which rely more on iDisc to voluntarily 
disseminate financial information have significantly lower COE financing. This finding is 
robust for firm-specific risk, information intermediaries, analysts' forecast biases, earnings 
surprise and information intermediaries. Second, we have shown that the effect of iDisc is more 
pronounced for less-visible firms that are smaller in size, have a low analyst following and a 
limited number of investors. These findings are consistent with the investor recognition notion 
that highly visible firms are likely to have a lower impact on the COE since their information 
is already disseminated through other information intermediaries. Third, we have extended our 
analyses to examine whether the magnitude of the news, when missing earnings forecasts or 
conveying more negative or positive meanings, would affect our main findings. We find that 
iDisc is negatively associated with the COE even after considering the magnitude of the news. 
Finally, the results are robust to different iDisc and COE measures. As a sensitivity check, we 
have: (i) used iDisc with hyperlinks to reflect the diffusion and spread of information; and (ii) 
applied the modified price-earnings growth (RPEG) model, as an alternative measure of the 
COE. The findings from these sensitivity analyses support our main results, suggesting that 
extensive use of iDisc reduces the COE. These findings motivate firms’ managers to use 
Twitter to disseminate financial information in order to enhance firms’ information 
environment and transparency and also to reduce the uncertainty and agency problem between 
informed and uninformed investors, which limits the firm’s accessibility to lower external 
financing costs. These findings also shed light on firm managers' concerns about firm visibility 
by showing that disseminating financial information on Twitter can benefit these firms and 
reach a wider number of investors. Managers should also consider engaging in iDisc activity 
to reduce the COE even when news about the firm is not favourable. 
Future research could examine other markers and how decision investments are affected 
by local social media practices. Similarly, other social media and big data platforms that have 
different characteristics to that of Twitter (e.g. Facebook or LinkedIn) could be considered. It 
would also be of interest to examine not just dissemination but also user engagement and 
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whether the sectors in which firms operate and the business norms in them play a role in social 
media investor engagement. We also acknowledge some limitations regarding the variable 
measurements, such as using SILICON as a proxy for technology firms, which is subject to 
some limitation as not all technology firms' headquarters are located in Silicon Valley. 
However, our study provides comprehensive evidence that using social media as a 
dissemination channel can have a real effect on the capital market. 
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Figure 1 
Research model 
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Table 1 
Summary of association between research model variables 
 
Variables Direction Related studies 
Dissemination of financial information (iDisc) -  
Firm size (SIZE) - (See Botosan, 1997; Dhaliwal et al., 
2006; Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Mangena et al., 2016) 
Book-to-market ratio (BTM) + (See Easton, 2004; Hail & Leuz, 
2006; Fama & French, 1992; Gode 
& Mohanram, 2003; Mangena et 
al., 2016) 
Financial leverage (LEV) + (See Cao et al. 2015; Dhaliwal et al, 
2006; Fama & French, 1992; 
Modigliani & Miller, 1958) 
Analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) + (See Dhaliwal et al. 2016; El Ghoul 
et al., 2018; Gode & Mohanram, 
2003; Guedhami & Mishra, 2009; 
Kothari et al., 2009a) 
Systematic risk (BETA) + (See Botosan, 1997; Botosan et al., 
2011; Cao et al., 2015; El Ghoul et 
al., 2011) 
Long-term growth rate (LTG) + (See Cao et al., 2015; Chen et al., 
2011; Gode & Mohanram, 2003; 
Guedhami & Mishra, 2009) 
Press coverage (NEWS) +/- (See Fang & Peress, 2009; Jung et 
al., 2014; Kothari et al., 2009a; 
Niessner & So, 2017) 
Institutional holdings (INSTOWN) - (See Attig et al., 2012, 2013; 
Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; Elyasiani et 
al., 2010) 
Earnings surprise (SURP) + (See El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim & 
Shi, 2011; Mikhail et al., 2004; 
Rogers et al., 2009) 
Return on assets (ROA) - (See Bowman, 1979; El Ghoul et 
al., 2018; Francis et al., 2005; Gode 
& Mohanram, 2003) 
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Table 2 
Firm Twitter and iDisc Characteristics 
Panel A: Twitter and iDisc Adoption among Firms in the Sample 
Type % to Firms with Twitter Account 
Firms use iDisc once 66% 
Firms use iDisc for three years 44% 
Notes: Panel (A) provides the percentage of firms in NASDAQ, with a Twitter account, which 
uses iDisc once and for three years. 
 
 
Panel B: Average iDisc use among Firms 
Years Average iDisc
 
 Tweets 
% of iDisc 
Financial 
Reporting 
(FR) 
Financing 
(Fin) 
Financial 
Term (FT) 
Financial 
Ratio (FR) 
2009 1 70% 11% 22% 18% 
2010 3 68% 10% 25% 18% 
2011 6 68% 10% 27% 27% 
2012 6 70% 8% 23% 16% 
2013 8 69% 8% 23% 14% 
2014 11 76% 6% 17% 11% 
2015 13 77% 5% 18% 11% 
Average 7 73% 7% 21% 15% 
      
Notes: Panel (B) reports the average number of iDisc tweets per year and summary statistic of the 
percentage use of iDisc components across the sample period. 
 
Table 3 
Industry Summary of iDisc 
Fama-French 12-Industry classification 
Percentage of iDisc based on 
Industry Total iDisc  
Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys 15.3% 1.2% 
Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 16.5% 1.0% 
Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture, Paper, Com Printing 33.6% 4.1% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 43.8% 0.3% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 48.1% 1.2% 
Software, Computers, and Electronic Equipment 54.0% 37.2% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 39.4% 4.1% 
Utilities 29.8% 0.7% 
Shops Wholesale, Retail, and Laundries, Repair Shops Services 16.2% 4.1% 
Healthcare, Drugs and Medical Equipment  36.4% 17.0% 
Mines, Construction, Bldg Material, Transportation, Hotels, Business 
Service, Entertainment 
36.0% 28.9% 
Notes: Table 3 provides summary statistics of firm use of iDisc across Fama-French 12-industry classification 
excluding financial industry for NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for all the Variables 
Variables N Mean Median Min Max SD 
COE 1358 0.051 0.044 0.003 0.161 0.034 
iDisc 4131 0.968 0.000 0.000 5.690 1.332 
iDisc_NUMBER 4131 7.418 0.000 0.000 295 20.699 
SIZE 4030 20.247 20.148 14.594 26.992 1.744 
BTM 3806 -1.374 -1.029 -18.364 1.703 2.132 
LEV 4006 0.160 0.065 0.000 0.758 0.205 
DISP 3298 0.162 0.093 0.016 0.846 0.185 
BETA 3046 1.191 1.153 0.385 2.197 0.402 
LTG 3940 0.094 0.150 -1.000 0.667 0.297 
NEWS 4111 5.557 5.434 2.639 8.354 1.042 
INSTOWN 3649 0.769 0.829 0.000 1.707 0.315 
SURP 3082 0.365 0.088 -4.529 2.996 0.927 
ROA 3912 -0.073 0.022 -1.142 0.216 0.274 
Notes: Table 4, summary statistics are presented for COE estimates, iDisc and other explanatory variables 
for NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (A and B) for definitions of 
the variables. The table presents the number of observations (N), mean (Mean), median (Median), minimum 
(Min) and maximum (Max) values and standard deviation (SD). To control for outliers, we use a 
winsorizing level of 2.5th to 97.5th percentiles for all variables except for iDisc, BTM and INSTOWN. 
Table 5 
 Pearson and Spearman Correlations for the Cost of Equity (COE), iDisc and Other Explanatory Variables 
Variables  COE iDisc SIZE BTM LEV DISP BETA LTG NEWS INSTOWN SURP ROA 
COE 1 -0.120*** -0.297*** 0.415*** 0.1020*** 0.010 0.183*** -0.097*** -0.058* -0.074** 0.151*** -0.094*** 
iDisc -0.085*** 1 0.079*9 0.012 0.055 -0.027 0.070** -0.034 0.082** -0.046 0.045 -0.106*** 
SIZE -0.323*** 0.125*** 1 -0.421*** 0.150*** 0.199*** -0.199*** -0.090*** 0.642*** 0.178*** -0.325*** 0.377*** 
BTM 0.145*** -0.041** -0.153*** 1 0.016 0.000 0.196*** -0.264*** -0.099*** -0.078** 0.25*** -0.416*** 
LEV 0.110** -0.006 0.143*** -0.132*** 1 0.102*** -0.015 -0.168*** 0.171*** 0.004 0.005 -0.239*** 
DISP 0.043 0.005 0.140*** -0.106*** 0.087*** 1 0.042 0.002 0.256*** 0.094*** -0.054 -0.008 
BETA 0.231*** -0.004 -0.121*** 0.068*** 0.089*** 0.035* 1 0.045 -0.049 0.024 0.198*** -0.197*** 
LTG 0.242*** -0.031* 0.228*** 0.034** -0.054*** -0.138*** -0.024 1 -0.055 0.031 0.062** -0.084** 
NEWS -0.095*** 0.098*** 0.63*** -0.143*** 0.125*** 0.178*** 0.029 0.098*** 1 0.084** -0.081** 0.087** 
INSTOWN -0.163*** -0.008 0.472*** 0.049*** 0.030* 0.002 -0.026 0.192*** 0.237*** 1 -0.174*** 0.064* 
SURP 0.184*** 0.013 -0.330*** 0.140*** -0.029 -0.036* 0.151*** -0.128*** -0.089*** -0.274*** 1 -0.268*** 
ROA -0.245*** -0.043*** 0.422*** 0.109*** 0.007 -0.182*** -0.110*** 0.358*** 0.158*** 0.383*** -0.209*** 1 
Notes: Table 5 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation between COE, iDisc and explanatory variables for NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. 
See Appendix (A and B) for the descriptions of the variables. ***, **, * present the statistically significant level at 1%, 5% and <10% respectively.  
Table 6 
The Impact of iDisc on Cost of Equity (COE) 
 (1) (2) 
 (OLS) (2SLS) 
   
iDisc -0.0014** -0.0028* 
 (0.0007) (0.0016) 
SIZE -0.0041*** -0.0043*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) 
BTM 0.0127*** 0.0130*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0023) 
LEV 0.0389*** 0.0339*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0081) 
DISP 0.00136 0.0003 
 (0.0065) (0.0089) 
BETA 0.0099*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0039) 
LTG 0.0438*** 0.0444** 
 (0.0148) (0.0190) 
NEWS 0.0036** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) 
INSTOWN 0.0008 -0.0005 
 (0.0043) (0.0051) 
SURP 0.0026 0.0039** 
 (0.0017) (0.0018) 
ROA 0.0132 0.0254 
 (0.0208) (0.0195) 
   
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
Wu-Hausman Test  0.215 
   
Constant 0.105*** 0.0980*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0248) 
   
Observations 829 551 
R2 0.476 0.472 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of the impact of iDisc on COE. The sample consists of 
nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (A and B) for definitions 
of the variables and measurements. Column (1) represents the results from pooled cross-sectional regression 
clustered at the firm level (OLS). Column (2) reports the results from the second stage of the 2SLS regression 
model. *, **, *** signify the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Table 7 
The Effect of iDisc on Cost of Equity (COE) for High- and Low-Visible Firms 
 High SIZE Low SIZE High ANALYSTS Low ANALYSTS High LNOWN Low LNOWN 
 (1) 
(OLS) 
(2) 
(2SLS) 
(3) 
(OLS) 
(4) 
(2SLS) 
(5) 
(OLS) 
(6) 
(OLS) 
(7) 
(OLS) 
(8) 
(OLS) 
         
iDisc -0.0006 0.0018 -0.0023** -0.0039* -0.0012 -0.0026*** -0.0008 -0.0017* 
 (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.001) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
SIZE -0.0037** -0.0051** -0.0081*** -0.0075***   -0.0033** -0.0053*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0026)   (0.0016) (0.0014) 
BTM 0.0075*** 0.0053 0.0147*** 0.0177*** 0.0121*** 0.0162*** 0.0108*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0022) 
LEV 0.029*** 0.0126 0.0413*** 0.0427*** 0.0352*** 0.0444*** 0.0314** 0.0383*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0107) (0.0131) (0.0091) (0.0145) (0.0088) 
DISP -0.0046 -0.0053 0.0094 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0104 -0.0149 0.0099 
 (0.0066) (0.0111) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0081) (0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0081) 
BETA 0.0033 0.0071 0.0138*** 0.0155*** 0.0084* 0.0141*** 0.0066 0.0102*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0068) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0035) 
LTG -0.0209 0.0005 0.0589*** 0.0568*** 0.0368 0.0617*** 0.0293 0.0506*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0280) (0.0172) (0.0204) (0.0319) (0.0167) (0.0258) (0.0168) 
NEWS 0.0027 0.0048** 0.0053*** 0.0068*** 0.00155 0.0005 0.0046** 0.0037* 
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.002) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0019) 
INSTOWN -0.0005 0.00156 0.0048 -0.0006 0.0070 -0.0030 0.0089 -0.0024 
 (0.0057) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0054) 
SURP 0.0022 0.0032 0.00181 0.0035* 0.0014 0.0027 0.0052** 0.0013 
 (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
ROA 0.0494** 0.0340 -0.0002 0.0220 0.0452** -0.0193 0.0383 0.0066 
 (0.0213) (0.0280) (0.0225) (0.0234) (0.0185) (0.0223) (0.0317) (0.0222) 
LNOWN       -0.001 0.0021** 
       (0.0013) (0.0009) 
ANALYSTS     -0.0051 -0.0055   
     (0.0044) (0.0043)   
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wu-Hausman Test  0.278  0.263     
Constant 0.111*** 0.136*** 0.163*** 0.139*** 0.0293* 0.0516*** 0.0833*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0455) (0.0160) (0.0167) (0.0275) (0.0264) 
Observations 365 219 464 332 383 446 258 570 
R2 0.350 0.334 0.537 0.546 0.400 0.519 0.604 0.475 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating our base Model (1) of the impact of iDisc on COE based on firm visibility. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter 
accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (A and B) for definitions of the variables and measurements. The full sample is divided into subsamples based on firm size, analyst following and number of investors. 
Firm observation placed on the 4th (1s, 2d, 3d) quartile level is designated as high visible (low visible) firms. Columns (1-4) represent the relation based on firm size (SIZE). Analyst following (ANALYSTS) is 
added to columns (5-6) and number of investors (LNOWN) is added to columns (7-8). The coefficient estimates are based on pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS), except for models 
(2&4), which apply 2SLS model (2SLS). *, **, *** represent the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 8 
News Magnitude of iDisc and Cost of Equity (COE) 
 Model (2) Model (3) 
 News magnitude 
(OLS) 
News contents 
(OLS) 
   
iDisc -0.0013* -0.0019** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) 
|SURP| 0.0007  
 (0.0006)  
NegSURP 0.0012  
 (0.0019)  
|SURP| * iDisc  0.0002  
 (0.0003)  
|SURP| * NegSURP -0.0002  
 (0.0006)  
TONE  0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
TONE * iDisc  0.00003 
  (0.00004) 
SIZE -0.0037*** -0.0042*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) 
BTM 0.0121*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0018) 
LEV 0.0331*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0075) 
DISP 0.0041 0.0015 
 (0.0076) (0.0065) 
BETA 0.0105*** 0.0097*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0031) 
LTG 0.0547*** 0.0441*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0148) 
NEWS 0.0028 0.0036** 
 (0.0018) (0.0017) 
INSTOWN 0.0013 0.0009 
 (0.0044) (0.0043) 
SURP  0.0027 
  (0.0017) 
ROA -0.0081 0.0141 
 (0.0174) (0.0209) 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
Constant 0.101*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0196) 
Observations 891 829 
R2 0.470 0.478 
Notes: The table reports the effect of iDisc on implied cost of equity capital after controlling for news magnitude 
and information content. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts from 2009 
to 2015. See Appendix (A and B) for definitions of variables and measurements. Model (2) presents the results 
after adding news magnitude based on earnings surprise variables. Model (3) includes the tone (TONE) of iDisc 
text, in which a tweet could convey the meaning of news reported and its interaction with iDisc (TONE * iDisc). 
TONE is measured based on positive and negative words from the Loughran and McDonald lists. The coefficient 
estimates are based on pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS) and *, **, *** represent 
the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
Applying Alternative Measures of iDisc and Cost of Equity (COE) 
 (1) (2) 
 COE 
(OLS) 
RPEG 
(OLS) 
   
iDisc_Hyperlink -0.0015**  
 (0.0007)  
iDisc  -0.003** 
  (0.0014) 
SIZE -0.0041*** -0.0053*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) 
BTM 0.0130*** 0.0017 
 (0.0017) (0.0024) 
LEV 0.0409*** -0.0211 
 (0.0076) (0.0149) 
DISP 0.00071 0.0192* 
 (0.0062) (0.0112) 
BETA 0.0099*** 0.0205** 
 (0.0031) (0.0088) 
LTG 0.0518*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0352) 
NEWS 0.0037** 0.0059*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0022) 
INSTOWN 0.00057 -0.0281*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0099) 
SURP 0.0028 0.0089** 
 (0.0018) (0.0037) 
ROA 0.0179 -0.145*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0334) 
   
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
   
Constant 0.104*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0381) 
   
Observations 829 1,550 
R2 0.483 0.283 
Notes: This table represents the regression results from estimating our base Model (1) using different 
measures of iDisc and COE. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts 
from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (A and B) for definitions of variables and measurements. We use iDisc 
with hyperlink in column (1). In column (2), we use RPEG as an alternative measure of the cost of equity. The 
coefficient estimates are based on pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS) and *, 
**, *** represent the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 10 
Robustness Tests for Including Other Additional Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 COE 
(OLS) 
COE 
 (OLS) 
COE 
 (OLS) 
COE 
 (OLS) 
     
iDisc -0.0015** -0.0019** -0.0015** -0.00141** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
SIZE -0.0031** -0.0048*** -0.0044*** -0.0041*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
BTM 0.0129*** 0.0171*** 0.0117*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
LEV 0.0352*** 0.0419*** 0.0373*** 0.0379*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.0076) 
DISP 0.0079 -0.0049 0.0015 0.0008 
 (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
BETA 0.0126*** 0.0044 0.0103*** 0.0099*** 
 (0.0034) (0.004) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
LTG 0.0560*** 0.073*** 0.0467*** 0.0457*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0195) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
NEWS 0.0031 0.0043* 0.0038** 0.0038** 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
INSTOWN 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0013 0.0009 
 (0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
SURP 0.0042** 0.0024 0.0030* 0.0026 
 (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
ROA -0.0015** 0.0612*** 0.0161 0.0149 
 (0.0008) (0.0166) (0.0225) (0.0214) 
ACCRUAL 0.0032    
 (0.0098)    
ADVERTISING  -0.0028   
  (0.008)   
SILICON  0.00311   
  (0.0035)   
CEOAGE  0.0017   
  (0.0025)   
MMT6   -0.0076***   
   (0.0019)  
MMT12    -0.0071*** 
    (0.0019) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0686*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0263) (0.0199) (0.0195) 
Observations 634 443 813 827 
R2 0.443 0.552 0.493 0.486 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating our base Model (1) by including additional 
robustness tests for our selected sample. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter 
accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (A and B) for definitions of the variables and measurements. 
Column (1) controls for information quality by adding discretionary accrual (ACCRUAL) as a control variable. 
Column (2) reports the regression after adding variables that relate to social media adoption (ADVERTISING, 
SILICON, and CEOAGE). We have also added price momentum in the last 12 months and 6 months in columns 
(3&4) to control for the sluggishness of analysts' forecasts. The coefficient estimates are based on pooled 
cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS) and *, **, *** represent the significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix A: Variables Definition and Measurements 
 
Variable Definition Measurement Source 
 
Dependent Variables  
COE Cost of equity 
The average expected rate of return of 
ROJ, RMPEG, RCT and RGLS minus the risk-
free rate. 
Bloomberg  
RPEG Cost of equity 
The expected rate of return based on 
Easton (2004) 
Bloomberg  
 
Independent Variables  
iDisc Firm's financial Tweets 
Log of 1 plus the number of financial 
tweets including (financial reporting, 
Financial term, Financial ratio and 
Financing terms tweets) 
Twitter API 
and Manual 
collection 
iDisc_Hyperlink 
Firm's financial Tweets 
with hyperlink 
Log of 1 plus the number of financial 
tweets that contain hyperlink 
Twitter API 
and Manual 
collection 
iDisc_NUMBER Firm's financial Tweets The number of financial tweets 
Twitter API 
and Manual 
collection 
SIZE Firm size 
Natural logarithm of market value of 
equity 
Bloomberg 
BTM 
Book value to market 
ratio 
Natural logarithm of book value to 
market value ratio 
Bloomberg 
LEV Financial leverage Long term debt scaled by market value Bloomberg 
DISP 
Analysts' forecast 
dispersion 
Standard deviation of 1 year ahead 
earnings per share forecast 
Bloomberg 
BETA Firm beta 
Slope coefficient of 60 months market 
return 
Bloomberg 
LTG 
The consensus long 
term growth forecast 
The average long-term growth forecast 
in June or two-year consensus EPS 
forecast minus one-year consensus EPS 
forecast divided by the mean of one-
year consensus EPS forecast 
Bloomberg 
NEWS News coverage 
Natural logarithm of number of news 
articles about the firm 
LexisNexis 
INSTOWN 
The percentage of 
Institutional ownership 
The proportion of the shares 
outstanding owned by institutions 
Bloomberg 
SURP Earning surprise 
Natural logarithm of the consensus 
earnings forecast for forthcoming fiscal 
year - actual earning / stock price 
Bloomberg 
ROA Return on assets 
Income before extraordinary items 
divided by book value of assets (total 
common equity) 
Bloomberg 
ANALYST Analyst following Natural log of number of analysts 
making an earnings forecast 
Bloomberg 
LNOWN Number of investors Natural logarithm of number of 
shareholders  
Bloomberg 
|Surp| Absolute earning 
surprise 
Absolute value of the consensus 
earnings forecast for forthcoming fiscal 
year - actual earning / stock price 
Bloomberg 
NegSURP Negative earnings 
surprise 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if earning 
surprise is below zero and 0 otherwise 
Manually 
computed 
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ACCRUAL Discretionary accruals The difference between discretionary 
accruals based on Jones model and 
firm’s corresponding discretionary 
accruals 
Bloomberg 
ADVERTISING Advertising intensity Advertising expenses divided by total 
sales 
Bloomberg 
SILICON Silicon Valley Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm is 
located in Silicon Valley and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream 
CEOAGE CEO age Indicator variable equal to 1 if CEO age 
is below the median value and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream 
MMT(6) Price momentum Compounded rate of return of the 
previous 6 months 
Manually 
computed 
MMT(12) Price momentum Compounded rate of return of the 
previous 12 months 
Manually 
computed 
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COE estimates Formula 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐽 
 
Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) employed 
by Gode and Mohanram 
(2003) model 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐽𝑁 = 𝐴 + √𝐴
2 + (
𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1)
𝑃𝑡
∗ ) (𝑔2 − 𝑔𝑙𝑡)
 
 
 
𝐴 = 0.5 (𝑔𝑙𝑡 +  
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
∗ ) 
 
EPS t+1 = The median of earning forecast per share for the next year in June 
DEPS t+1 = Dividend per share for the next Year computed as pay-out ratio for firms with 
positive earning or 6% of ROA 
𝑔2 is the short-term earnings growth rate of EPSt+1 and EPSt+2 or long-term growth rate of 
analysts’ forecasts. This model requires EPSt+1> 0 and EPSt+2> 0. 𝑔𝑙𝑡 is the difference 
between 10-year treasury bonds yield and 3% 
 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 
 
Modified Easton (2004) 
cost of equity module by 
Gode and Mohanram 
(2003) 
  
 
 
𝑃𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1)
𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺
+
𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1)𝐸𝑡[𝑔𝑠𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  ⨯ (1 + FDIV)]
𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺
2
 
 
 
Pt = firm price in June in each year 
FEPS=the median of earning forecast per share for the next i year at time t 
FDIV=forecast dividend pay-out ratio equal to (
DPS
EPS
) 
DPS=dividend per share  
EPS= earnings per share  
The model assumes positive FEPS but if EPS is negative, FDIV is measured by replacing 
EPS by 6% of return on asset. 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝐶𝑇 
Claus and Thomas (2001) 
 
 
 
𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝐵𝑡 + ∑
[𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑅𝐶𝑇  ⨯  𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1] 
(1 + 𝑅𝐶𝑇)
𝑖
5
𝑖=1
+
[𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+5 − 𝑅𝐶𝑇 ⨯  𝐵𝑡+4]  ⨯ (1 + 𝑔𝑙𝑡) 
(𝑅𝐶𝑇 − 𝑔𝑙𝑡)(1 + 𝑅𝐶𝑇)
5
 
 
The model measures earnings per share for the next 5 years by using analyst forecasts. The 
forecasted earnings for the 4th and 5th years are estimated by the earning forecast of the 3rd 
year and growth rate of long term earnings. If the long-term growth rate is not found, EPSt+2 
and PSt+3 are used. The long term abnormal earning growth rate is measured as 10 years 
Treasury bonds minus 3%. Clean surplus relation is used to estimate future book value 
(𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 = 𝐵𝑡 +  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 −  𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡+1). Estimating future dividend is estimated by 
multiplying earnings per share by pay-out ratio (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 =  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1  ⨯  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉).  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆 
 
Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan (2001) 
 
 
 
𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝐵𝑡 + ∑
[𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆]  ⨯  𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 
(1 + 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆)
𝑖
𝑇−1
𝑖=1
+
[𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝑇 − 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆]  ⨯  𝐵𝑡+𝑇−1 
(1 + 𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆)
𝑇−1𝑅𝐺𝐿𝑆
 
 
 
The model measures forecasted return on equity by using analyst forecasts for the next 3 
years. From the 4th year to T number of years, ROE is forecasted using linter interpolation 
to industry median based on 10 years historical industry specific ROE. In case the industrial 
ROE is lower than the risk-free rate, Industrial ROE would be replaced with risk free rate 
(Liu, Nissim, and Thomas, 2002). It is also assumed that t = 12, which indicates that ROE 
48 
 
remains constant afterwards. The research also assumes that firms are classified under 48 
industries as defined by Fama and French (1997). Additionally, the model applies a clean 
surplus to estimate forecasted book values of equity.  
 
Where, 
𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 −  𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 =  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1  ⨯  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉 
 
𝐶𝑂𝐸 
 
 
 
The cost of equity measured by the average of four measures (ROJ, RMPEG, RCT and RGLS,) 
minus risk-free rate. 
 
𝑅𝑃𝐸𝐺 
 
Easton (2004) Price 
Earnings Growth Model 
 
 
𝑃𝑡
∗ =  
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆5 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆4
𝑅𝑃𝐸𝐺
2
 
 
 
The first model is for the short-term horizon and the second is for the long-term horizon. 
Pt = = firm price in June of each year, 
FEPS t = median of earning forecast at year t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
